Upon tasking himself with creating an infographic on primary education in India, Akshan Ish found that while India’s literacy rate is steadily growing, and the country boasts of having one of the largest workforces in the world by 2020, the education system fails to equip students with fundamental skills at the elmentary level – leaving a huge chunk incompetent to contribute to the fast growing economy. 

In this post, InPEC has also included Akshan’s background notes, which gives the reader a look into the process of infographic design.

By Akshan Ish, 19th December, 2012

[Click on the infographic to see a larger version]

The designer’s background notes:

Education is one of the most complex systems to deal with. I say this with conviction because I’m working on a project related to student evaluation in schools. Documentation in progress, here. India is one of the fastest developing countries, part of the G20, and is poised at a very crucial stage. We enjoy the benefit of what is called a ‘demographic dividend’–where most of our population is young and able to join the workforce. But due to a shaky education system, a major portion of India’s population is found incompetent even with fundamental skills. Literacy rates are increasing across India, currently at 74%; but as I found out after digging out the data, that literacy doesn’t necessarily mean that one can read or write.

I started off with the OECD report on Improving Access and Quality in the Indian Education System, which provided an overview of the scenario. It gave country comparisons  and I was quite disappointed to see that India comes under the category of Low Education Development Index (EDI), ranked 102 in the world. Further probing into the reports from various sources, mainly the Annual Status of Education Report (2011), showed me why. India’s Educational Deficit stems from the fact that primary schooling is very weak. I found that although enrollment rates were high at the primary level, only about 40% of those students make it secondary school, and only 12% go on to college. Class absenteeism, high pupil-teacher ratio, low involvement of parents, multi-grade classes and gender disparities are a few of the reasons why.

What intrigued me the most was that 75% of the students who moved from one grade to another could not read their previous grade’s textbooks. And another 75% of these who moved on to the next grade, would not be able to do so in another year of schooling. This means that one in three students finishes primary schooling without being able to read a grade 2 textbook; but is termed literate since she is being schooled. And to make matters worse, these learning rates have been declining in most states across India, even after the Right to Education Act was passed in 2009. The objectives of which are to provide free and compulsory education to all children between the ages of six and fourteen. It might seem that the focus shifted from quality to quantity after the act was implemented; but that is only a thought.

There was just so much going on in the data, and so many factors like caste, gender, mother’s education, region, religion and economic burden that came into play that I could not possibly visualize the entire thing. I had to narrow down to something. I wanted to explore a form of storytelling with this infographic, so I thought it would be interesting if I could portray the story of India through a six year old girl’s journey. What are the odds that she will finish schooling? Where is she most likely to study? What are the different factors affecting her learning?

The infograhic itself is in a web-scroll format (heavily influenced by the New York Times visualizations). I have tried to keep it as simple as possible–enabling the reader to move from one section to another like in a book or a story, so as to give the reader an overview of the current Indian Education scenario, moving on to quality of learning and then the factors affecting learning.

[I have learned] to strip down the issue at hand to its core and then build on it from there. I have also become much more careful with the visuals I use now. People do not question a visual like they would question a piece of written text. The visual is like automatic truth that is assimilated subconsciously.

Akshan Ish is a computer science engineer and currently a graphic design student at the National Institute of Design, Ahmedabad, India.

Filed under: Articles, India

Children playing football in Mali (Photo via Wikimedia Commons)

On January 11, 2013, French President François Hollande sent a military expedition to rescue Dioncounda Traoré’s government from the “imminent terrorist threat”. Camille Maubert, a security analyst, explores this turn of events. 

By Camille Maubert, 16th January, 2013

Five days after the French “surprise” intervention in Mali, it is – to say the least – not clear what operation Serval is all about. Brandishing UN Article 51 (which proclaims the individual and collective right to protect a member subjected to armed aggression), French President François Hollande sent a military expedition to rescue Dioncounda Traoré’s government from the “imminent terrorist threat”.  750 ground troops, 30 tanks and several Rafale combat planes have thus been mobilised to strike Islamist strongholds in the North and West of Malian territory, making, according to “security sources”, important damage to the groups’ bases and leadership.

However, doubts are rising as to what the ins and outs of the intervention are in a context where reliable information is scarce. Indeed, most of the information publically available relies on two sources. On the one hand there are the official communiqués published by the various actors’ communication outlets which are often politically biased, and which are therefore unreliable and/or contradictory. For instance, while French defence spokesperson announces 60 terrorist casualties, the Malian army increases their number to “hundreds” and Islamic groups refuse to make any statements. On the other hand, the local press predominantly relies on witness accounts from the population and “local officials”. The weakness of such sources is patent, as they are based on what people saw, or think they saw, and therefore produces subjective and incomplete interpretations.

Keeping these limitations in mind, here are a few facts and thoughts that may shade some light on this disconcerting chain of events.

A recent national survey (Ifop) revealed that 63% of French citizens from all political backgrounds support the French armed intervention in Mali. Such “unanimous” rallying of the political intelligentsia at the bugle call is a worrying sign that Hollande’s decision to engage in the conflict was taken hastily, without real political debate. Ex-Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin, who proclaimed France’s opposition to the Iraq War, deplored the “unison of warmongers”, asking how, from Afghanistan to Libya and Mali, France became “infected by the neoconservative virus” and came to take the lead in hazardous interventionist policies. Far-left representative Jean-Luc Mélanchon also expressed concerns about the legitimacy of the operation, condemning Hollande’s disregard of Parliament in his decision-making process. Others denounce the intervention as a reinstatement of the infamous “Françafrique”, which favoured the Metropole’s role as gendarme in its ex-colonies.

Yet, in his first Presidential speech in Africa, Hollande claimed his presidential term would break away from such noxious relationships and prioritise African sovereignty and political independence. On this ground, he declared as early as last October that no French troops would be involved in the Malian crisis, preferring an African solution to an African problem, dialogue to conflict. Hollande also announced a total pull-out from Afghanistan and strict reduction of France’s military budget for the years to come, in an attempt to fill the country’s debt gap. Why then, would he engage in a costly military intervention (assumed to cost 400 000€ per day)?

The justification invoked by Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault for France’s intervention is the support of his Malian ally, the commitment to the fight against terrorism, and the implementation of 22 December UNSC resolution 2085 which supports the creation of an international assistance force (MISMA). In some déjà-vu scenario, UN recommendations – specifically emphasising the importance of political negotiation among African counterparts – were however ignored in favour of unilateral military intervention by a Western army claiming to interfere “for a few weeks” to restore order and re-install a democratic government.

But this time, François Hollande appears to have committed to eradicate terrorism in Mali on his own. Despite an apparent consensus on the necessity to contain and defeat an Islamist entrenchment in Mali, the international community seems to position itself very cautiously vis-à-vis a crisis which ins and outs are not clear yet. Indeed, although ECOWAS countries pledged to send ground troops (Nigeria mobilised 600 men, Niger, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Togo 500 men each, and Benin 300) in the near future, it may take several months for them to prepare and take over control of the operations. In addition, Western states like the US, UK, Belgium and Germany only committed to provide the Malian army with medical and transport aid but no military assistance.

Moreover, France has no solid partner in Mali. The Malian army is still divided by the power struggles that toppled President Amadou Oumani Touré last January, numerous soldiers deserted, and the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) maintains its claims to the Northern half of Malian territory, restricting anti-terrorist operations in the area. On the contrary, the French intervention may possibly reinforce the Islamist groups which, until now, were divided along ideological allegiances and political agendas. French troops might provide them with a common enemy to fight and any civilian casualty they cause will be used to mobilise the population on their side.

As a result, French troops may well have embarked in a long and difficult campaign in Northern Mali. After almost a week, Operation Serval shows no sign of any serious strategic vision. As mentioned above, it is extremely difficult to obtain intelligence about events in this area and, although air raids on Islamist strongholds do restrain the groups’ room of manoeuver, one should not forget that militants are experimented and well equipped fighters with a good knowledge of the terrain – a desert territory larger than France.

France thus became the major actor in a crisis which complexities might well reach beyond expectations.

Firstly, the identity, structure, capabilities and support base of the groups it is confronted to are particularly uncertain, as are the intra and inter-group relationships and agendas. The absence of clear understanding of who the so-called terrorists are and how their activities fits in the wider regional dynamics is a major weakness of the French plan of action and may lead to unexpected setbacks in the future.

Secondly, the abovementioned amalgamation of the diverse Malian actors under the single label “terrorists” wrongly conveys the simplified idea that French troops are up against one unified enemy. Quite the opposite; they are moving into a multifaceted society where allegiances are shifting and prominently based on (cross-border) tribal structures.

Lastly, and most importantly, by taking such strong stance in Mali, France may further jeopardise its interests in the West African region. Paradoxically indeed, by intervening directly against Islamist militants, it increased its perception as an “enemy of Islam” and thus became more vulnerable to attacks. The menace against French nationals is particularly  significant in Mali itself where 6000 residents remains, but also in the wider region where Al Qaeda detains 8 hostages to date and threatened to retaliate if the operation were to go on.

Camille Maubert is an international security researcher based in London. Her work focuses on security, intelligence and counter-insurgency, with a specific interest in Afghanistan and Pakistan. She has completed a Masters degree in International Studies and Diplomacy from SOAS, London, and is currently pursuing a Masters degree at King’s College War Studies Department.

This week marks the 40th anniversary of Roe vs. Wade, the landmark decision by the US Supreme Court on the issue of abortion. Claire Beckenstein, a political consultant in Washington DC, looks at the political culture surrounding the issue to discuss how far American women have come and how far they still have to go.

By Claire Beckenstein, 22nd January, 2013

Abortion is an issue that evokes visceral responses from people at both ends of the spectrum.  This issue has the ability to divide a nation and separate a family.  It is so powerful that people will even kill in the name of the cause.  On the 40^th anniversary of Roe v. Wade, one could exhaust themselves for days thinking of the questions and assumptions around what America would be like without legalised abortion.  If we continue to fight the issues from our past we cannot move forward.  Therefore, it is best to focus on the present and note how monumental this decision has been for women and their health, especially to those women who view abortion as a choice, a freedom and as a right to take control of their future.

What strikes me the most about this issue is that everyone has an opinion; most notably those that have never had an abortion or have ever attempted to walk in another’s shoes.  Let’s be clear, no one wants the procedure and no one wakes up excited to have one. It is not a decision people make lightly.  It is painful in every sense of the word and there is no single reason for why people have an abortion.  When you talk to women who have had one, their personal view is overshadowing by a national stigma against it.  They are seen as selfish, promiscuous or unwilling to take personal responsibility with no respect for the sanctity of life.  I believe that when you sit down and really listen to women who have gone through the medical procedure, the response you will get is so far from that stigma.  You find a brave women who made the best decision based on the situation they were dealt.  You may even see hope and a sigh of relief that they had the option to put their life and well-being first.

I have heard a lot of chatter recently in anticipation for the anniversary of Roe v. Wade, mainly chatter focused on the decline of the “pro-choice” women’s movement and their inability to mobilize the base.  While I agree with this decline and think that the movement only sees resurgence when they are under attack, I also believe we must change our perspective on a day that means so much for so many.  We need to shift our attention away from the decline in the “pro-choice” movement and onto the lives changed and saved in the past 40 years from the legalization of abortion.  This is about reproductive justice and the freedom to control our bodies.  People need to accept that this is a medical option you can take without fear of being shunned.  We need to use our voices and proclaim this is real and is happening as we speak.  We can only do this by removing the curtain that stigmatises abortion and celebrate the progress we have made.  Abortion has a face and that face belongs to your mother, sister, friend, aunt, neighbor, mentor or maybe even you.

This day should remind us all of how far we have come and how far we still need to go.  It should not focus on a movement’s failures, generational divides or lack of energy, but celebrate the victories in the women’s movement that have led us to this moment.  I hope that the women from 40 years ago marching for our rights would be proud of where we have come, and I hope I am proud of the next generation to hold the torch.  Most importantly, I want everyone to take a second and pause today to think of what the world will look like as a woman 40 years from now, and what the progress we have yet to make will look like.

“The right to health and access to medical treatment and medication is one of the fundamental human rights anywhere in the world. Please do not allow the killing of our sick children, beloved families, and fellow Iranians from the lack of medicine, caught in instrumental policies of coercion and power.”

by Farid Marjai and Mehrnaz Shahabi, 4th February 2013.

“Iranian Mothers for Peace,” in an open letter of January 2013 to Mr. Ban Ki-moon, the UN Secretary General, and Dr. Margaret Chan, the Director General of the World Heath Organization, have alerted the responsible world bodies and human rights organizations to the critical shortage of vital medication due to the US/EU-led sanctions on Iran and their deadly impact on the lives and health of the Iranian population.

Iranian Mothers for Peace is a non-profit forum, well known and respected in Iran’s civil society.  In 2006 a number of social activists came together to form this forum.  Mothers for Peace is not a political party and organisationally it has a flexible structure.  Mothers for Peace takes pride that its 700 participants come from very diverse political backgrounds and different social classes.  It affirmatively celebrates diversity which it considers a reflection of the tolerance the group espouses.

With the ideal of peace in mind, Mothers for Peace is open to all participants who take a stand against any form of violence, poverty, and oppression.

“In our campaigns to protect the environment, we encourage measures that reduce the impact of human violence against it.  We take solid steps to eliminate and mitigate gender inequality.  Over the years, our projects have focused on welfare of addicts and prisoners, and publicizing their rights.

“The scope of our vision and work is to achieve social security and permanent peace.  Hence, this non-profit institution has a wider definition of the concept of ‘peace’; it refutes the narrow perspective of ‘peace’ as mere absence of external military violence and confrontation.  And it is precisely in this context that we view the Western-imposed crippling sanctions on the people of Iran as a form of structural violence — a silent, yet a predatory war.

“The everyday reality we observe on the ground in Iran has convinced us that the draconian sanctions are victimizing the very fabric of the society we intend to strengthen.

Presently, a number of the core group members of ‘Mothers for Peace’ are suffering from cancer.  Sadly, they are having a difficult time obtaining the medicines needed for their treatment, and like many of their compatriots they suffer from unnecessary additional anxiety that might further deteriorates their precarious health condition.”

Below is the text of the open letter (published at mothersofpeace-iran.com/?p=1049) in English.

* * *

Farid Marjai is a contributor to Reformist newspapers in Iran.  Mehrnaz Shahabi is an anti-war activist and independent researcher.

The drone program has considerably intensified under the Obama administration. As the American press and congress are only now waking up to this fact, the silent response from the White House shows the president is not quite the peacekeeper he projects himself to be.

By Gulshan Roy, 26th February 2013

Drones. You hear about them spying from everywhere though you can never see them. At last, however, you may now luckily read quite a lot about them in the written press. On February 6th, The New York Times revealed that air-strikes conducted in Yemen came from unmanned armed vehicles (UAVs) from an American military base in Saudi Arabia. Since, every hawk and every dove of every state in America made sure to have their screeching and cooing heard on the issue, drowning the debate in their deafening staccato. Why so much agitation, you may ask?

The role of UAV’s in U.S defence strategy has been steadily growing and could soon become its most important component. Under President Obama, the use of drones has already increased more than twofold than under his predecessor Monsieur Bush. Their numbers have increased from fifty-four in October 2001 to more than 4000 today. America intends to invest a further $17.9 billion on them over the next ten years.

It is not only their numbers that have increased, but also their loci of influence. Aside from the most frequent drone strikes you hear coming from North Waziristan and Yemen, UAVs have also been caught spying on Iran and late on Saturday, it was announced that 100 American soldiers would be deployed to set up a drone base in Niger. It seems U.S security strategists are obediently abiding by Napoleon’s old adage that ‘war is above all a business of positions’.

Yet, the clearest indication of this administration’s love of remote-controlled flying machines came with the appointment of John Brennan as the new CIA chief. Brennan had until now been in charge of the secret kill-list of Al-Qaeda insurgents under the Obama administration- he wrote down the names, the drones killed. The obdurate intensification of the program shows that the president finds something deeply enticing with the UAVs.

Think about it: drones enable you to peer down onto the enemy’s base without anyone being inside the machines. They also come much cheaper and require less coordination than a ground infantry operation. Today, the United States is able to assist France in their Malian operation through drones deployed from Niger- not one American life will be at risk. Yet, their greatest advantage, we are told, is that they can take down an enemy with minute precision with zero collateral damage, that is, with no civilian casualty. Or can they?

Take the case of Salem Ahmed bin Ali Jaber, for instance, who was a cleric denouncing Al-Qaeda in his village mosque in eastern Yemen. He was killed as a drone missile shot down its target, an insurgent with whom Mr Jaber and other men were arguing under a cluster of palm trees. Over 3,500 people have been killed, just like them, in 420 drone strikes under Obama. I will concede that the case of Mr Jaber does not in itself question the accuracy of the UAVs, but questions instead the judgement of those who have decided to strike.

How do a group of men arguing under a cluster of trees in Yemen constitute a direct and imminent threat to U.S national security? The American hawks and doves were quite happy to avoid this inconvenient question until two Predator drones shot down Hellfire missiles on Anwar Al-Awlaqi’s vehicle in September 2011. Al-Awlaqi was a U.S citizen alleged to have helped the former UCL student Umar Abdulmutallab in his bomb attempt on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 in December 2009. The killing of a U.S citizen was thrown into the lions’ den of the American press and suddenly, killing clerics in faraway mountains was not quite OK anymore. And what of the emperor? Was it OK for him to execute his own subjects at will?

Only now is Congress waking up to the reality of the true extent of the drone program. It is still unsure how to respond to all this partly because just like us, it is treading into largely unknown territory. In the absence of any light coming from the White House, congressmen have timidly whispered for greater checks on the president’s prerogative in the form of a ‘drone court’, composed of judges, to decide whether to give a green light to the president’s shooting-down order. Neal Katyal of the New York Times thinks it is a bad idea. I think it is an absurd one.

But congress must conjure something to impose a check on the president’s prerogative. For unilateral action has never been well received among liberal democrats (remember Bush). Saskia Sassen of Columbia University, an authority, even goes so far as arguing on Al-Jazeera that the drones program signals a new era for liberal democracies, “where the executive branch gains power partly through its increasingly international activities.”

It is difficult to disagree. As the debate over the program rages in the press and in Congress, drone bases continue to be built far to the East and the silence from the White House remains religious. One can hardly eschew the conclusion that Mr Obama’s mantle of liberal Nobel Peace Prize winner hides a far more ruthless commander-in-chief.

Gulshan Roy has pursued economics and international studies in university, most recently at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. He regularly writes for publications in Mauritius, which is his country of origin.

He can be followed on twitter here.

Iranian newspaper clip from 1968 reads: “A quarter of Iran’s Nuclear Energy scientists are women.” The photograph shows some female Iranian PhDs posing in front of Tehran’s research reactor.
Photo courtesy Wikimedia Commons

As talks have resumed over Iran’s nuclear program in Almaty, the failure of the sanctions regime raises serious questions about mainstream diplomatic commonplaces. Far from being the favour it is portrayed to be, the rapprochement effort towards Tehran from the P5+1 is borne out of necessity.

By Gulshan Roy, 8th March 2013

“Iran won’t retreat one iota from its nuclear program” was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s declaration on Iranian national television on the 9th of November 2011. The Iranian President is used to defiant flourishes as evidenced by his repeated promises to ‘finish off’ Israel. To his credit, however, his resolve not to sink in the face of gradually increasing pressure from the West has been steadfast. His country is weathering a deadly sanctions regime that has all but crippled the Iranian economy. Last week, the two sides met in Almaty, Kazakhstan in a desperate attempt to salvage the worsening situation. And as a beaming Mr Ali Baqeri (Iran’s deputy chief negotiator) left the fruitless round of negotiations with the P5+1 (the five permanent Security Council members and Germany), sanction-fanatics in the West were uncomfortably loosening their ties and scratching their moist foreheads. They ought to.

The regime under Ayatollah Khomeini is dispelling a myth that has emerged in mainstream diplomatic spheres over the last decades- that if you use the stick of sanctions hard and often enough, you will eventually obtain what you want from the other side. G.C Hufbauer, J. Scott and K.A. Elliott examined the history of sanctions between 1914 and 1990 and found them to be effective in only one-third of cases. Robert Pape, a Stanford political scientist, argues that this figure ought to be brought down to an eighth. I suspect a rotund silhouette somewhere in the north of the Korean peninsula would silently nod in agreement.

In the case of Iran, one need not delve too much into scholarly readings about coercive diplomacy to understand why the model failed. A set of strenuous economic sanctions has caused the Rial to free-fall against the US dollar over the past two years, hurting ordinary Iranians as they pay more for everyday imports. Several humanitarian agencies have been ringing the alarm bells over the dearth of medical supplies coming into Iran, a situation that is threatening many lives. As the country’s relative wealth shrinks, Iranians are more than ever fuming at the West. The regime has cleverly suited the situation to its ends, adopting the Indomitable Gauls narrative with evident success. Iran is showing no signs of ceding ground and the return of diplomats at Almaty is a sign that the rest of the world is waking up to that reality.

There is another, slightly more complex argument to be made for the P5+1 group to redefine its relationship with Tehran, and it involves Damascus. Sunni-Shia tensions in this part of the world have not often been this fragile, as we have seen from the recent bombings in Pakistan. Last Thursay, Nouri al-Maliki, Iraq’s prime minister went so far as warning that an opposition victory for the Sunni majority in Syria would spill-over causing sectarian violence in both his country and Lebanon. He has a point. Iran has consistently backed Bashar Al-Assad’s Alawite (a group akin to Shia Islam) regime and has been accused of arming Hezbollah in the conflict. It is not difficult to see why: The volume of trade between the two countries is just over US $16 billion. In the last 3 years Iran and Syria have agreed a gas pipeline deal worth US $10 billion, a US $5 billion-deal for a Centre for Strategic Research to be opened in Iran and another one for a jointly-owned bank to be opened in Damascus. If, or rather when, Bashar Al-Assad falls, Iran’s influence in the country might fall with him- a disaster for an already limping economy.

Hence, a paper published by Loren White of the Atlantic Council, a think tank, argues that genuine diplomacy might be the most efficient way of approaching the Iran nuclear quandary. Mr Ahmadinejad has hinted at being open to the idea of Syria becoming a mediator in the negotiations over its nuclear disarmament while there is little doubt that he would be anxious to ensure Alawite representation in a transitional Syrian government. These two presents for Persia could just aid the rapprochement effort with Tehran.

Henry Kissinger recently stated at Davos that a war with Iran could happen in “the very foreseeable future.” The deadline for a resolution is set for the day Iran’s uranium enrichment reaches 20% which, according to the International Atomic and Energy Agency would enable it to use its nuclear power for non-civilian purposes. At the current trend, it should be able to reach those levels before the end of 2013. Hasan Danaie-Far, an Iranian ambassador, did little to help temper minds when he declared on the 24th of January that “the only card remaining on the table is war.” Do not be conned, however, as for all the bicep-flexing both sides know that war is a last resort. Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps is severely wounded by asset-freezes while neither Europe nor America would rub their hands at the idea of another prolonged intervention in these troubled times. How Israel will respond as we approach the 20% D-day is unknown, though one may guess.

In 53 BCE, Crassus, a Roman famed for his wealth led a 40,000-strong army of centurions into the large empty plains of Carrhae (modern Harran) in Persia certain he would only meet negligible resistance. The Romans confronted 10,000 Parthian horsemen archers. After a few days’ fight, all that remained of the Romans were some 500 captured survivors, while the head of the legendary Crassus was sent to the Parthian King Orodes for some courtly fun and games.

This is a part of the world that has seldom buckled under outside pressure. Though Western diplomats are at pains to make their return to the negotiating table sound as a favour, what transpires is that they are doing it out of necessity and a faint sense of panic. Meanwhile, the Ayatollah’s regime stoically refuses to budge. One would venture making the argument that the country the historian Michael Axworthy calls ‘the Empire of the Mind’ presently just about holds the edge in a fascinating battle of wits. The question is for how long?

Gulshan Roy has pursued economics and international studies in university, most recently at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. He regularly writes for publications in Mauritius, which is his country of origin.

He can be followed on twitter here.

The author investigates whether the proposed reforms in India’s financial, energy and retail sectors really make a difference to the economy which many have said has ‘bottomed out’ this fiscal year. 

By Yayaati Joshi, 12th March 2013

To begin with, I deem it appropriate to describe the proposed reforms and the purported merits of those reforms in the financial, energy and retail sectors of India, and mention briefly, the state of the affairs of the Indian economy. The growth of the GDP in the last 5 years has been less than encouraging, to say the least. Looking at the trend of the GDP from 2004—that’s when the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the key figure of the 1991 Economic Reform, has been shouldering the responsibility of running the country—it has resembled a sine curve, with the crests and troughs rising and falling dramatically in 2010 onwards.

One would have satisfied oneself by imagining, that the crests and troughs represent the inevitable movements of the business cycle, but the cycle seems to be moving only in one direction after 2010: downward. The GDP growth fell sharply from 9.6% in 2010 to 6.9% in 2011, and the growth rate slipped to a dismal 5.5% during the first quarter of 2012.

In response to the slowing of the growth rate, the government of India has decided to take a few measures to revive the economy. Chief amongst them is the plan to change the regulatory structure of the financial markets. Currently, there are as many as four regulators in the Indian financial markets, namely: the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) and the Pension Fund and Regulatory Development Authority (PERDA). However, the efficacy of SEBI, the most important of the regulators, has been under question ever since it was found that a whole-time member of SEBI acted as a whistle blower regarding its inability to handle effectively the cases of corruption against some players in the market. To address this, the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission (FSLRC), recommended reducing the number of regulators to just one.  Under the proposed plan, a sole regulatory body will help integrate the regulations of the entire market, thereby ensuring expediency in doing business and in facilitating free exchange of liquid capital assets. This will be important, as capital is increasingly becoming more stateless, in the sense that the world is moving towards the concept of Capitalism 3.0, and “integration” is now the key to not only regional, but also global economic prosperity.

This reduction in the number of regulators is most interesting, as its effect will not be limited to the financial sector.  Recently, the government has, amid much hullabaloo, approved infusion of foreign capital. Simply put, this decision will open up India to companies like Walmart (a multi-brand retail operation) as well as IKEA (a single-brand retail operation). Despite all the optimism, the fact that the organised retail sector accounts for only 5% of the entire retail market cannot be ignored. By encouraging foreign investment, India is looking to be at par with other countries in Asia such as Japan, where organised retail sector accounts for over 60% of the retail market. In the long run, the growth in the organised sector will produce externalities, which will be beneficial for the economy as a whole.

Liberalisation of the energy sector remains to be a key reform in the country.  The power failure in Northern India in July 2012, an indelible blot on the face of the Indian government, gave impetus to the predominant policy of attracting foreign investments. The privatisation of the energy production sector through foreign direct investments (FDI) is intended to ensure reliable and consistent access to power. About three months later, the government proposed the restructuring of the debts owed by the states in India. Although the power producers and the states themselves breathed a sigh of relief, government intervention in debt payment showed the inability of the states to produce electricity in such a way that the demand does not outstrip the supply. While the government itself knows that there can be no, “one step solution” to the problem of electricity, foreign investments have been earmarked as essential.

Re-examining the events that led to the economic reforms in 1991, we can surmise that the reforms were as much a result of IMF’s suggestion as they were of the Finance Ministry’s own volition. Notably, a Balance of Payments crisis occurred in 1991, forcing the government to take IMF’s advice of suspending import tariffs, moving from a fixed to a floating exchange rate as well as deregulating the industrial sector. As per the plan, Quantitative Easing was implemented, and profit-making public sector undertakings were promoted and prevented from being privatised. Now, 22 years later, the government faces a similar situation — that of fiscal deficit — and people are looking at Mr. Singh’s prowess to redeem the Indian economy once again. The (literally) million-dollar question is – will liberalisation work a second time?

In a speech, Prime Minister Singh stated that the government had been voted twice “to protect the interests of the aam aadmi” (Hindi for common man). In the same speech, he made it a point to remind the nation that “money does not grow on trees”— a reference to the growing fiscal deficit and the obligations that it places on the government. In order to finance those obligations, the government needs to make certain unpopular decisions, i.e. increasing fuel prices. This rise in prices is a self-defeating policy for an Economist who claims his approach to be inclusive growth.

Similarly, it is quite clear, that despite Mr. Singh’s assurances, foreign direct investments in retail would hamper the well-being of the local retail trade. Walmart would look to backward and forward integrate its processes, and eventually, to eliminate any middleman costs and supply chain debacles that they face. Perhaps, realising this himself, Mr. Singh has given veto power to the state governments, whether they want to fling open their doors to foreign investment in their respective retail sector. By doing this, he has, on paper, done the right thing as far as the economy is concerned.  Politically too, he has done the right thing, by letting the states decide for themselves — if they want to prioritise local retail industry over the foreign retail giants.

India is composed of various states, differing in culture, economy, geographical conditions and connectivity, and even more so, on the merits and pitfalls of foreign capital.  This never ending struggle that the government faces of choosing either its votes – by making decisions which will not help the economy from bouncing back – or its economic principles, following which, is the only way to improve the state of affairs. Stuck in this quandary, the government will always have to temper its difficult decisions by including more populist elements in the strategy, such as this one in which it is the state governments that ultimately decide the fate of foreign investment.

The reforms that have been planned by the government are all long-term measures, as opposed to some slapdash policy meant to create only momentary benefits. However, the chances of the same government being re-elected are slim, owing to the media exposés of various scandals involving some government ministers.

For instance, FDI in the retail industry, while presumably dampening the local retail industry to begin with, will in the long run, produce more jobs, result in higher wages and reverse the effects of the vicious circle of poverty. Therefore, for these reforms to be truly effective, the common man will have to get rid of the myopic view he has of “growth”. In fairness, the concept of delayed gratification is hard to explain to a nation, with 40% of its people earning a daily income of less than $1.25.  More importantly, the common man, for whom the government claims to be working for, will have to forget and forgive its misdeeds and give the government another chance to prove itself.

One remembers former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan when he said that “good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.” Mr. Singh needs to be re-elected in order to finish what he started. Sadly, due to the political machinations, it is believed that even if the UPA is re-elected, Mr. Singh, the Oxford economist, is unlikely to become the Prime Minister again.

In the absence of a figure who can oversee and truly understand the implementation of the economic reforms and policies discussed above, chances are the benefits from the reforms will remain an unrealised dream, and their effects will be limited, and will tend to favour only those who possess the wherewithal to see the bigger picture. And that’s akin to making a medicine, that will cure a disease, but only of those who have some special, innately endowed, genetic advantages.

The views are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent the editorial position of InPEC. 

The provocative rhetoric coming from North Korea could hide a faint sense of desperation.

By Gulshan Roy, 3rd April, 2013

On Saturday 30^th March, a statement released by the highest North Korean command warned that it was entering “a state of war” with its feuding southern neighbour. As Koreans on both sides watched the unfolding drama being broadcast on every major international television news channel, Mr Kim Jong-un managed to conjure an even more spectacular artifice by releasing photographs of him discussing with his senior commanders under the backdrop of a ‘Plan to Hit the U.S Mainland’ written in bold. News channels are not often presented with opportunities for such great TV. Yet, Mr Kim’s moment of teeth-showing turned into bathos once it reached its intended audience: instead of injecting any sense of panic on the other side of the Pacific, the images received in Washington were swiftly turned into material fit for some banter over bourbon.

The escalation of tensions between North Korea and the Seoul-Washington axis tends to occur each time the South elects a new chief of government. So when Madame Park Geun-hye was recently inaugurated South Korea’s new president, the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea (DPRK) ensured that tradition was duly respected. Furthermore, the situation was not helped by the fact that her inauguration came just before the annual US- South Korea joint military exercise which also triggers the North’s fuming fits.

President Obama’s administration would have half-expected this flourish from the hermit kingdom. Since the scenes showing the overzealous emotion with which North-Koreans wept over the death of the ‘Dear Leader’ Kim Jong-il, his son has had to work out a way of asserting himself as the new Supreme Leader, one that would at least emulate the isolationist achievements of his lineage. In other words, he has needed a way of rallying his people behind him. Mr Kim (Junior) did not need to seek the counsel of Iran’s president to understand that the most effective way to achieve that aim was to openly display some petulance towards everybody’s favourite old foe- the United States. By showing some verbal muscle this weekend, he might think his ploy will pay dividends at home but he has in fact taken an unnecessary gamble, for the last vestiges supporting his regime outside his half of the peninsula are beginning to disappear.

After the United Nations brokered an armistice between the two halves of Korea in 1953, the South rested on firm U.S support. In the decades that followed, it adopted a model of economic growth that favoured trade and openness to foreign investment, penetrating notoriously impervious markets with aplomb (the automobile industry for instance). Seoul’s diplomats quickly mastered international geo-political subtleties through its economic success and its show of good faith towards the said universal values enshrined in the UN Charter.

In contrast, its neighbour made of isolationism its leitmotif, with the exception of the relations it cultivated with its allies of the communist bloc. Mr Kim Junior’s father in particular had carefully woven a close tie with Beijing over the years. After the fall of the Soviet bloc, and more recently in 2002 since it began having nuclear aspirations (earning itself a place in Monsieur George Bush Junior’s ‘Axis of Evil’- Star Wars stuff), North Korea has had to increasingly rely on Chinese support to the point that it would today crumble without it: 32% of its population is undernourished and its per capita GDP is at par with some of the lowest in the world. Without China as its éminence grise, the Pyongyang model would end in tragedy, highlighting why Mr Kim Junior may have committed a blunder by affording himself a little too much wit.

In an article in the East Asia Forum, Professor Kia Qingguo of the School of International Studies, Peking University, argues that there are several reasons why China might be tempted to unplug its life-saving drip to its long-term protégé. Until now, Beijing’s policy has been to find a delicate balancing act between North Korea’s denuclearization (as no one enjoys the sight of a nuke in the neighbour’s backyard) and its stability (as Pyongyang’s collapse would lead to a considerable influx of refugees coming into Chinese territory), while ensuring that its relationship with a state with a 1.2million-strong army remains a serene one. Until now, the emphasis for Beijing had been on North Korea’s stability but the tables have turned. The inauguration of China’s new president Xi Jinping marks a radical departure from its traditional Pyongyang policy, as the North Korean Ambassador would best know, having received a stern telling-off from the Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi following the most recent nuclear test coming from the peninsula.

Yet, China’s fading support for Kim Jong-un is by no means the main reason behind America’s humorous reception of his masquerade. On 28^th March, after North Korea had cut off its hotline with the South, the United States conducted air drills with stealth B-2 bombers on a close-by island stating they could conduct long-range strikes (including nuclear ones) swiftly and with precision. Since the end of the Second World War, nobody has quite matched Uncle Sam’s polished military biceps and Mr Kim’s arsenal still looks faintly plump and rotund in comparison: he has plans to strike the U.S mainland but his long-range ballistic missiles can only reach Alaska (and even that is questionable). Should he intend to further escalate into conflict, rest assured even the first U.S president to ever win the Nobel Peace Prize would not hesitate one second to press the red button inside his nuclear suitcase (remember Hiroshima).

In a sense, the Supreme Leader could scarce have afforded not to riposte to America’s stealthy B-2 quip. He would have appeared weak while his people would have reminisced on past days of supposed glory under his father and grandfather and would have more importantly felt that the foundations of their model were being shaken. But we outside the DPRK know just how fragile these bases really are. With the freshest round of UN sanctions and China’s hand stroking the plug, the young leader is facing what are probably the most testing times in his country’s history. Thus, the thunderous roar from the north of the Korean peninsula that should have made the calm Pacific tremble and Mr Obama shiver sounds more like a weak squealing plea of help.

Sparing a thought for the victims of the 30^th March Floods in Mauritius.

Gulshan Roy has pursued economics and international studies in university, most recently at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. He regularly writes for publications in Mauritius, which is his country of origin. He can be followed on twitter here.

The Editor of InPEC – Siddharth Singh – attended the Clean Energy Ministerial that took place in Delhi on the 17th and 18th April, 2013. The Prime Minister of India, while inaugurating the summit, reiterated several clean energy promises that the Government of India has made in the past. In an article on RTCC (Responding to Climate Change), Siddharth analyses whether India has the capacity and will to keep up with these goals. 

By Siddharth Singh, 24th April, 2013

On a recent RTCC article, I begin,

“(The Prime Minister made…) bold promises about India’s commitment to the (renewable energy) cause. These include a goal to double India’s renewable energy capacity from 25000 MW in 2012 to 55000 MW by 2017.

This in turn includes, for instance, the National Solar Mission which has an objective of developing 22000 MW of solar capacity by the year 2022. These are a part of India’s commitment to reduce the energy intensity of its GDP by 20-25% by 2020.”

I present a few reasons why India may find it hard to keep up with these promises. Two of these are, 1. general delays in project implementation and 2. the overbearing fiscal deficit. From the article:

“(…) it is commonplace to find projects delayed across sectors. According to a study by the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, as of May 2012, 42% of the infrastructure projects in consideration were delayed.

Another issue is the precarious fiscal situation of the government.(…) The impact of this may go either way for the renewables sector. On the one hand, lowering fossil fuel subsidies and the rise of overall electricity prices (by the ways of a loan restructuring arrangement with state electricity companies) may make renewables more competitive with traditional sources.”

To read this article in its entirety, please visit RTCC by clicking here.

Siddharth Singh is an economic analyst based in New Delhi. He is the Editor of InPEC. He can be found on Twitter here.

In this essay Abdulaziz Al-Mossalem looks at the current state of oil rent in Kuwait.  The IMF has revealed that Kuwait could be headed towards deficit spending by 2017 if things continue along their current path.  Abdulaziz argues that the current relationship between the ruling authority and the people could be prohibitive to the implementation of a tax system.  Only when the ruling authority is seen to be responsible and transparent can such a move be considered.

By Abdulaziz Al-Mossalem, 5th June 2013.

The recent International Monetary Fund consultation by Kuwait revealed that total state expenditure could exhaust all oil revenues by 2017.[1]  The IMF suggested that the state should start to increase its capital expenditure, to cushion the expected deficit spending and even endorsed the introduction of a tax system.  In Kuwait and the rest of the Arab Gulf states there is no income or value added tax; actually the opposite is the case where bonuses from the state are granted to the citizens in addition to the subsidizing of the essential consumer goods.  I will analyse the two recommendations.  I argue that while the increase in capital expenditure is possible but difficult, the introduction of an income tax in the present amounts to no less than the political suicide of the ruling authority.

The Sovereign Wealth Fund

In writing about the “Keynesian accounting equality” i.e. of savings equalling investment, Hazem El-Beblawi argues that the Arab SWFs have not been properly utilizing their savings.  He explains that real investments (as opposed to nominal) are a safer option for these funds to engage in.  He adds that if the funds turn their attention to the less developed countries (LDCs) there will be the opportunity to expand on real investments.[2]  The reason why focusing on the LDCs is needed is because the current nominal investments in the developed countries have a weak inflation hedge, while the LDCs would require real (capital good) investments with a stronger inflation hedge.[3]

Investment vs. Placement

El-Beblawi highlights the distinction between investment (real investment) and placement (nominal investment) for the SWF.  He explains that what has been realized by the Arab SWFs is a focus on placement instead of investment.[4]  With investment, finance is used to add to the capital goods of the economy.  This would result in the holding of the means for increased production in the state.

Placement on the other hand adds to the financial assets of the state, but has nothing to do with increasing the productive capacity of the economy.  An example of placement would be the obtaining of debt instruments by the fund.  The issue here is that the capital goods, because of their productive purpose and tangible nature, are less vulnerable to the fluctuations of the financial market in comparison to the non-tangible financial assets.  El-Beblawi concludes that

Increasing financial assets without corresponding increases in real investment contributed to the emergence of inflation in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, and eventually the collapse of the financial markets in 2008.

The accounting equality of saving equalling investments, for the Arab SWFs savings, was satisfied primarily by the increase in financial assets in the developed countries and not the capital goods.[5]  Due to this vulnerability to fluctuations in the financial markets, the KIA has had its savings eroded in the past (see figure 1 at end of paper).  The most recent effect was between March and December of 2008 where the KIA reported a loss of more than 30 billion dollars of its total asset worth.[6]

To safeguard against the vulnerability of placement, what the Arab SWF can do is focus on investment in capital goods.  This cannot be significantly accomplished in the developed world as an increase in available real investments would require an increase in the domestic demand structure, which is not captive in the developed world.[7]  The same cannot be said for the developing world where captive markets are more easily identified.  To invest in these developing states, the SWF can utilise the potential for demand to have the savings be paralleled with real investments satisfying the demand.  El-Beblawi however explains that this is easier said than done.  The primary reason being is that the LDCs are “mismanaged, lack skilled labour, and are deficient in infrastructure.”[8]  Yet the current exposure to the fluctuations in the financial markets seems to place much at risk, and so the real investments in the LDCs are perhaps the wiser option.

The KIA – In Need of More Risk Diversity?

Established in 1953 with the surplus oil revenue, the KIA’s mission was to have investment returns reduce the state’s dependency on the oil rent.  Today the KIA’s total assets are worth more than 300 billion dollars, and it is considered one of the largest and oldest SWFs in the world.  The KIA contributes a gross fixed investment that is worth 15% of GDP.[9]  Not much is known about the KIAs share of holdings in companies or the geographic location of these holdings.  This, along with other criteria the KIA failed to satisfy, has resulted in the SWF receiving a 6/10 in the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index.  The reason why the KIA has scored so poorly is because of the SWF’s own laws, which prohibit the disclosure of information to the public.[10]

What we can account for, of the KIA’s 300 billion dollars is a fraction of the total asset value in investments.  The KIAs core holdings for example, in Daimler and BP, are worth 6.6 billion in today’s share price.  The holdings in Europe and the US are managed by the Fund for Future Generations (FFG).  It is one of the two funds controlled by the KIA.  The other fund is the general reserve fund (GRF).  What distinguishes the two funds from each other is that the GRF is the state’s repository for oil revenue.  Of that revenue, by law 25% must be allocated to the FFG annually.  While the FFG manages the investments outside the MENA region, the GRF manages those investments within that region.

The current investment strategy was set up when the managing director of the KIA, Bader Al-Saad, was appointed in 2003.  His first order was to hire a consultant group to review the KIA’s investment strategy.  The consultant group suggested several points, one of which was to diversify risk.  As a result the KIA gradually reduced its asset allocation in the equity investment class from over 70% to just over 50%, while increasing the asset allocation in fixed income and alternative asset classes. (See figure 2)  It is unclear how much of the asset classes the KIA is invested in are Shariah compliant.

The only reason this is relevant is because the total assets of Islamic finance worldwide grew from 250 billion dollars in 2005, to 1.8 trillion dollars today.  In 2008 Al-Saad announced through a local newspaper that the KIA would increase its Sharia compliant investments.[11]  However what this increase amounts to is unclear due to the transparency issues; what is known is that the KIA is a shareholder in a couple of Islamic banks in Kuwait – the Kuwait Finance House and Warba.  According to Asim Ali from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Initiative, “the advancement of Islamic finance among SWFs has been anaemic to date.”[12]  While real investments in the developing world are sufficient to create a good inflation hedge, perhaps the careful inclusion of Islamic finance is the next step.  As one writer explains, it is the “only means of ensuring an economic model of regional development […] will be perpetuated, while maintaining the delicate balance between what is economically effective and morally desirable.”[13]

Introduction of an Income Tax – Unlikely

The IMF consultation has endorsed the GCC wide implementation of a VAT and income tax.[14]  While ideally generating revenue from taxes might seem like the obvious answer to resolving the prospects of deficit spending; the problem with this idea, however, is that it does not give consideration to the relationship between the people and the ruling authority in Kuwait.  This relationship can be described as the political acquiescence from the people towards the ruling authority, in exchange for the distribution of the oil rent.  The distribution of the oil rent has been systemized to grant employees in both private and public sectors a bonus income from the state.[15]

In addition the Kuwaiti household is granted subsidized basic foodstuffs, and is expected to pay a symbolic amount in exchange for its water and electricity consumption every year.  In reality, the ministry of water and electricity is not even pursuing the fees.  A conversation I had with an employee at the ministry revealed that the crushing majority of households have failed to pay their water and electricity bills leaving the outstanding amount in bills to be settled at half a billion dollars by the end of 2012.[16]

Distributing the Oil Rent for Acquiescence

It was perhaps with the rise of Sabah Al-Ahmad, the current Emir of Kuwait, that the distribution of the rent took on a more explicit role.  Significant amounts of money began to be distributed across the state following any real increase in political tension.  After gaining the status of Emir in 2006, one of Sabah’s first orders was to grant every citizen 300 KD (just over 1000 usd).  This decision came about following Sabah increasing his own stipend from 28 million USD annually, to 178 million.  He made the decision to distribute the money to off-set the piling up of the opposition’s ranks that were critical of the increase of his own stipend.  This was not the only time Sabah distributed hard cash across the entire state.  With the advent of the Arab spring, Sabah ordered the distribution of more than 3500 USD to every citizen on February 2011.[17]  Recently parliament passed a law relieving all citizens of their debt’s interest rate prior 2008– this relief cost the state 2.6 billion usd.[18]  There are also rumours circulating of yet another 3500 USD to be spread out following the political turmoil in Kuwait.

Continuing to grant the ruling authority the political acquiescence, without the distribution of the oil rent can perhaps be realized if the ruling authority opted for a more aggressive approach towards the people – which from a constructivist standpoint is unheard of.  In Saudi Arabi for example, no representative body can dare to try and grill the third in line for the kingship.  The history of the ruling families rising to power in the rest of the GCC states witnessed the use of force, creating a stronger divide between the ruling authorities and the people.  In Saudi Arabia’s case, Ibn Saud waged war against five tribal confederacies before declaring himself King in 1932.

In Kuwait, the ruling authority reached its position without the resort to war.  The case can be made that the conflict is limited to within the ruling family (such as Sabah’s struggle with Saad for succession in 2006, and Mubarak’s famous killing of his two brothers in 1899). But the conception of a ruling family armed against the people with the aim of putting them down by force never took shape – a more reconciliatory relationship almost always existed.  This is the reason why the introduction of a tax system would off-set the relatively closer relationship between the people and the ruling authority.  While maintaining stability with the rise of political tension has been responded to with hard cash distributions to alleviate that tension; the thought of imposing an income tax would, by the distribution-stability standards, contribute to the opposition’s ranks.

Members of the Kuwaiti opposition originally wanted to scrap all debt incurred by citizens, but with the opposition’s boycott of the latest elections the current national assembly is perceived by a significant portion of society as the ruling authority’s “yes-men/women.”  This highlights the distinction between the ruling authority and the members of the opposition.  While the former want to utilise the oil rent to keep a stable threshold, the opposition aim to expand the distribution capacity of the state.

Yet not all members of the opposition are resistant to the idea of an income tax.  The socialist opposition for example is in favour of imposing a progressive tax.  That is a tax which increases the higher the individual’s income is.  I recently conducted an interview with Khalid Al-Deyain, who is a member of the socialist opposition in Kuwait.[19]  What Al-Deyain was opposed to was the Value Added Tax (VAT).  He expressed his objection to how the VAT treats the high income earner and the impoverished individual as equals.  The socialist opposition does not have a single member representing them in parliament, and compared to the other candidates be them the tribal service deputies, the liberals or the Islamists; their support base is relatively small.[20]

Would Democratization Help?

Basma Kodmani highlights the need to democratize the wealth funds.  Specifically she talks about the need for a freedom of information law to show where the Arab SWF is making its investments.  More importantly, it would pave the way for public discussion and scrutiny to how the finances are handled.  While many of the Arab states, especially Kuwait, have made progress with regards to freedom of expression and association over the past decade; Kodmani explains how public finance has remained outside the sphere of public scrutiny.[21]  Indeed it was only after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which brought in new faces to the public finance sector after the liberation, that the embezzlement of 1.2 billion usd was discovered.[22]  It must be highlighted this case is what was discovered, what is not discovered will remain as it is so long as investment information is withheld from public oversight.

The embezzlement took place between 1986 and 1992.  A lawsuit was filed against the Kuwait Investment Office’s (London Based KIA office) chairman.  The chairman, Fahad M Al-Sabah who is a member of the ruling family, was accused of setting up various shell companies in cooperation with others based in Spain.  He was accused and found guilty of engaging in fictitious loans and investments.  The new KIO team that was appointed after the liberation of Kuwait took the accused former leader to court – actually several courts. The sheikh who stole the money resided in the Bahamas, KIO was based London and the embezzlement took place in Spain with the stolen funds themselves involved in 19 other states, and so legal action was taken in all these states.  In 2008, 15 years after the embezzlement, the KIO management won the case and was awarded recovery judgment worth 1.1 billion, half of which has been actually recovered so far.

Another case which was discovered, were the procedural abuses made by Ali Al-Khalifa al Sabah, the Finance minister during the Iraqi invasion.  The abuses were pointed out by the minister of oil in a report in 2001 (ten years after the liberation of Kuwait).[23]  The report revealed that the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company was suspected to have embezzled, through false transactions, 200 million usd.  The former minister was not found guilty of embezzlement however due to the lack of evidence – yet this ruling was publicly received with significant criticism.  The reason being is that Ali Al-Khalifa was perceived to have had a humble financial background prior to the concerned transactions, but appeared to have gained significant wealth after the liberation of Kuwait.[24]

In both cases the abuses were only pointed out after a new management team took over the office.  The public could have remained ignorant of these abuses if the new management decided remain silent.  For this reason, the democratization of public finance, in this case the improvement of the KIA ranking on the Linaburg-Maduell transparency index, would certainly add an extra reason for the person in charge to abide by the procedural process.  In this regard, when I asked Al-Deyain why more democracy is needed in Kuwait he said “it would help force the sheikh in charge to separate his proud status as sheikh from the duty assigned to him.  As sheikh he is surrounded by yes-men, and if he is left without public scrutiny, he will merge his complacent environment with whatever public office he holds – this results in procedural abuses.”[25]

What about the Tax System?

Giacomo Luciani explains that whenever the state needs to tax its citizenry, the issue of democratization comes up.[26]  If a tax is imposed there would be less political acquiescence and a greater demand for holding public figures accountable.  This is captured in the slogan “there is no taxation without representation.”  If the state does decide to introduce a tax system, the income it accrues from the people will be coupled with the expectation of more public involvement in governance.  This would not be limited to the financial sphere but the overall political environment.

Today the Kuwaiti opposition are already explicitly calling for having a PM from the people, which by law is sanctioned.  It just so happens that the custom in the state had every PM be perceived as the second or third in line for the emirship, hence all were part of the ruling family.  The imposition of a tax would certainly boost the demand for a PM from the people, or perhaps even go further and aim to limit the powers of the Emir himself.[27]

In this regard the perception of the ruling authority by the people plays an important role.  The citizen will ask himself “who is handling the expenses? And can I trust him?”  The former Prime Minister Nasser Al-Mohammed was grilled for his multi-billion dollar spending on trinkets; a leaked document from the State Audit Bureau revealed that Al-Mohammed spent, for example, around a million usd on carpets, cufflinks and watches as gifts to visiting delegations. (See figure 4)[28]

Today the members of the ruling authority are granted a separate income in addition to the distribution of the oil rent the rest of the citizens get.[29]  This financial divide between the people and the ruling authority would not be received well by the tax payer; quite simply the tax payer would perceive the sheikh in charge as someone who would mismanage the state’s tax income because of the lack in transparency, and further solidify the income inequality between the ruling authority and the people.  This would make the imposition of a tax one of the last things the ruling authority would want.  Essentially they would be in a position to choose between being held more accountable in return for the tax paid, or maintaining the status quo which is to have the political acquiescence in return for the wealth distribution.

One way to reconcile the likely resentment the people would feel towards the ruling authority if the tax is imposed is by dropping the added benefits ruling family members enjoy.  These families are not limited in number in the European sense, and do form a significant portion of society.  Having them start off on a level playing field, equal in all aspects to the rest of society, would certainly make the rest of society more open to the option of an income tax being imposed.

Conclusion

The IMF consultation revealed that Kuwait might be headed towards deficit spending in 2017.  I look at the two endorsements the IMF made, which are the increasing of capital investments through the state’s SWF and the possibility of implementing a tax system.  I explain that it is difficult to fully assess the investment approach of the KIA due to transparency issues; however I point out the likely possibility that the KIA was impacted by the fluctuations in the financial markets due to its nominal as opposed to financial investments.

As for the implementing of a tax system I explain how the current relationship between the ruling authority and the people might be resistant to such a move.  I conclude with highlighting the importance of the ruling authority portraying itself as a responsible and transparent manager of the wealth.  It is practically only after such a perception of the ruling authority is made true that the possibility of a tax system being imposed would not lead to public resentment towards the government.

Editor’s Note: This piece was written originally to be published on the 17th of May, 2013. Two months have passed since, and Egypt has undergone a sea change since then. In spite of this, we hope that this opinion piece will offer some academic food for thought. 

By Abdulaziz Al-Mossalem, 17th July, 2013 (Originally, 17th May, 2013)

After the toppling of Egyptian president Mohammad Hosni Mubarak and the election of the Muslim Brotherhood, tourism and foreign investment in Egypt fell. Coupled with the increased perception of business risk after the overthrow; the thoughts on economic development were divided between those who thought that the region is on the verge of a start-up boom, and others that are wary about investment in the state. The brotherhood’s impact on business opportunities will depend on several variables. Most important of which is their ability to maintain transparency in decision making, and preparedness to push for inclusiveness. I argue that the potential for improvement in the economy is significant given the readiness of entrepreneurs; however the brotherhood’s political capacity will be the real determinant of whether potential start-ups can be utilised.

Unfavourable Prospects?

Jane Kinnimont, the senior research fellow on the Middle East and North Africa at Chatham House, notes that the Mubarak government was unable to liberalize the investment climate in Egypt. Despite attempts to do so, domestic businesses were dominated by “corruption and cronyism which left entrepreneurialism out.” With the coming of a new government arises a possible opportunity to have the domestic business plans allow for a wave of start-ups. The sponsorship from MIT and Google for a start-up competition in 2012 demonstrated that there is no shortage of domestic business plans which the new government can utilise.

The start-up success will depend on whether the government will create the appropriate environment for these potential start-ups to bring in investment. The current decline in investments can be attributed to the lack of transparency, and the brotherhood’s moralizing inclination. It should be noted that the moralizing inclination is not to be compared to the puritanical trend which took place in the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, but more simply should be viewed as how inclusive the brotherhood can be of others and their ideas which may not conform to the brotherhood’s doctrine.

Transparency

With regards to the lack of transparency the brotherhood has been perceived by many as the old system’s new guard, minus the subtle secular orientation. Morsi’s attempt to grant himself sweeping powers, by temporarily exempting the judiciary from reviewing his decrees in 2012 has, coupled with the tortures and “extra judicial deaths” created the wrong impression among Egyptians. The brutality of some of the police officers towards the civilians after the election was responded to by sentencing only a couple of police officers. The police generally remain immune to being held accountable because the old elites still makeup a large part of the bureaucracy. This has effectively turned the undecided Egyptian into an opponent of the brotherhood.

The potential investor seeing the tension on the ground, in addition to the increasing budget deficit, youth unemployment and deteriorating currency would hesitate on the decision to invest in the state. While there are some clear opportunities for the foreign investor, such as the planning of Sukuk issuance by the new Egyptian government, the brotherhood’s political capacity appears to fail in measuring up to the reform people were expecting after Muabarak. The Sukuk bill waiting for approval by the parliament could raise, according the Egyptian finance minister, 10 billion dollars for the state due to the high demand for Islamic bonds. The bill however has been criticized for its potential to have the creditor seize the assets (and the Suez Canal has frequently been used as the example prior to amending the bill), once the state fails to pay off its debt. The amount the sovereign would raise has also been thought to be exaggerated. Negotiations on the technicalities of the bill will remain on-going until the election of parliament during summer.

Moralizers

The failure to measure up to expected reform has been noted by many commentators. Thomas Friedman for example explained a couple of months ago that the brotherhood should try and prove that it is inclusive and fair towards all Egyptians, and not feed the existing suspicion that the brotherhood are committed to endorsing their own support base. The reason being is that a significant portion of Egyptian capital, worth billions of dollars, has been invested outside of Egypt because of scepticism and fear of the brotherhood’s intensions. Those sceptical of the brotherhood are largely the Coptic Christians and the cronies of the Mubarak era.

In my assessment, Morsi has succeeded in pushing for a level of inclusion and reasonableness shown in the new constitution which was thought to be beyond the brotherhood’s limits. Article 30 of the constitution is perhaps the clearest sign of the brotherhood’s willingness to depart from the parochialism Hassan el-Banna (and to a limited extent, Sayid Qutb) established for the brotherhood. Article 30 states “Citizens are equal before the law and are equal in general rights and duties without discrimination between them based on gender, origin, language, religion, belief, opinion, social status or disability.” However the question then becomes whether what has been announced is enough. While on paper the brotherhood’s views are harder to scrutinize than expected, in practice the fear is that there will arise the expropriation problem between the shareholders which used to plague the old regime. A continuation of the old system would mean that the dominant share holder in a corporation would, through influence on the manager, divert resources from the corporation to benefit the dominant group in Egypt at large while side-lining the (for example) Copts and cronies of the former regime.

The fear of the retroactive application of the law on the cronies is another issue. Friedman explains that a general amnesty to all “who don’t have blood on their hands” is one of the best things Morsi could do to start a clean page inclusive of all. The Coptic Christians and beneficiaries of the former regime will be sure to assess the reasonableness of the brotherhood in their policy making. Specifically, they want to be sure that all Egyptians start off on a level playing field. This is essentially what makes any doctrine reasonable, the ability to accommodate others with dichotomous views despite the inclinations one has. Concerns about gender equality are another issue. The brotherhood has not been, throughout their history, the biggest supporters of gender equality and empowerment of women. In fact the case can easily be made for the opposite. It is for this reason that Morsi’s announcement, that his two vice presidents will be a women and Coptic Christian, was met with cautious optimism.

Conclusion

The brotherhood’s capacity to accommodate the entrepreneurs in the state will depend on their ability to turn the political scene into something stable and attractive for the investor. To do this the brotherhood will need to ensure that they are perceived as pushing for more transparency and inclusion of all. I explain that while the brotherhood does appear to have succeeded in abandoning the parochialism their brand of political Islam is associated with, the brotherhood’s opponents still remain suspicious which has maintained billions of dollars outside of Egypt. One thing the brotherhood can do to invite these investments is grant amnesty to some of their opponents to show that revenge is not an intension of theirs. This move coupled with a clear abandonment of the Mubarak era impunity towards the ministry of interior would create a more attractive scene for the investor.

Bibliography

• Chicago Tribune, “MIDEAST DEBT-Egypt sukuk issue would find buyers, end of year likely.” Last modified 2013. Accessed March 21, 2013. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-03-06/news/sns-rt-egypt-sukukl6n0bwa60-20130306_1_sukuk-islamic-finance-gulf-investors.
• Christopher Schroeder. CNN Money, “In the Mideast, entrepreneurs flourish.” Last modified 2012. Accessed March 21, 2013. http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/09/07/middle-east-startups/.
• Chris Wright. Euromoney, “Islamic Banking: Egypt Approves Sukuk Bill as Financing Crunch Hits.” Last modified 2013. Accessed March 21, 2013. http://www.euromoney.com/Article/3148034/Islamic-banking-Egypt-approves-sukuk-bill-as-financing-crunch-hits.html.
• Clement Moore Henry, and Robert Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 73. See also Friedman.
• Joshua Stacher. Foreign Affairs, “Morsi’s Guns The Officers Backing Egypt’s President.” Last modified 2013. Accessed March 21, 2013. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138804/joshua-stacher/morsis-guns.
• Test Paper – Economist Intelligence Unit. Opportunity in the Aftermath of the Arab Spring. 26 April 2012.
• Thomas Friedman. “The Belly Dancing Barometer.” The New York Times, Feb 19, 2013. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/20/opinion/friedman-the-belly-dancing-barometer.html?_r=0 (accessed March 21, 2013).

Abdulaziz Al-Mossalem is an international relations scholar who has worked as a journalist in Kuwait. He is currently pursuing his doctorate at the The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. 

InPEC brings to you the “Discovery of India” log of Karthik Radhakrishnan, an engineering graduate student from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, as he travels through India. This chapter describes the tale of a village in Tamil Nadu which is hit by floods every year and the residents do not have adequate means to get by.

Chapter 1 is available here.

Place : Thalainayar (Nagappatinam District, Tamil Nadu)

Date : 22nd July, 2013

By Karthik Radhakrishnan, 29th July, 2013

Thalainayar is a Town Panchayat in the district of Nagappatinam (For people who remember the Tsunami of 2004, Nagappatinam district had the maximum number of casualties in Tamil Nadu.) This is a story of a tiny village in this Panchayat, Santhantheru, whose residents have no food, no drinking water and absolutely no money. This village gets flooded for three months every year and the residents are put up in a nearby school, where close to a hundred families live together with inadequate food and space. The floods take away both the lives and livelihood of these poor people who rely totally on agriculture for their food.

“Once a year, our village gets flooded. The houses get washed away, there will be snakes moving around and dead bodies floating around us. We will not have time for anything, we just pick up our children and swim to the nearby school where they would put us up for three months.” - says Lakshmi, a resident. The normalcy with which these words were uttered is quite haunting and their situation, almost unimaginable.

Most of the agricultural activities in this part of Tamil Nadu are rain-fed, but it seldom rains. When it does rain, the rain water and sea water together displace the entire village. The village does not have any irrigation facilities and laying bores is meaningless because the groundwater is mostly salty. There has been very little farming in the past ten years and as a direct consequence, there has been very little money as well for the past ten years. To add salt to their wounds, the village has been converted from Village Panchayat to Town Panchayat (because of the growing size and population) which implies that they don’t get the benefits of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act and hence, no alternate source of income. Just to put things into perspective, the average annual income of a family here is Rs. 10,000 (that’s around $166.66, less than a dollar a day!).

Although households do not have food or water, each house has a color television, owing to election freebies offered by politicians in the state. Lakshmi makes a very valid point when she asks ”What’s the point of a TV? Can we eat it?” Typically, a family runs on the very little money the woman makes. In spite of the lack of funds, the men drink alcohol with whatever money they earn. “Once they see the money, they forget that they have families and that they have to bring home some money. Their priority is to drink, with even the little they make” say Shanthi, who has quite visibly been affected by an alcoholic husband. It is not much of a surprise that the political parties buy votes with a few bottles of liquor in rural Tamil Nadu. Democracy is neatly mixed, bottled and sold.

There is a Women’s support group present in Thalainayar, whose main job is to provide loans for women and help in improving their living condition. “We provide awareness to women about hygiene and provide loans up to Rs.6,000 for women to help them build toilets in their houses.” says K. Dhanabagyam, a field agent in this organization for almost ten years. Just when you think there is some hope left in this village, she says “We charge an interest of 26 per cent on these loans.” TWENTY SIX PERCENT! These villagers have no means of livelihood, meanwhile this organization is sucking the blood out of them. When asked why they charge so much (banks offer loans at 6%-10% interest), she says, “With us, there is not much hassle and no waiting time.” Lets call a spade a spade, this is merely a business, not a support group. They do not provide awareness on health or usage of sanitary pads or equality. Just out of curiosity, I asked the women of Santhanatheru if they think they are equal to men. There was a long pause, some giggling and then, a subdued response, “Men and women here live in peace.”

In spite of all the difficulties, the people have made sure that their kids go to school. The village school has classes only upto eighth grade, but they are determined to send the kids to the nearby town for further studies. A few people have managed to send their kids to college as well and try to make a living out of the little money their kids send from the cities.  The “Midday Meal Scheme” is quite successful here and is keeping the kids at school. In the wake of recent controversies surrounding the meal program, this particular village and its people (especially the teachers) have made sure that the safety of the students is their top priority.

The privileged masses of India are not aware of the difficulties faced by the bottom 22%. We read about “them” in the newspapers and see “them” on television. For us, “they” are merely a statistic. But to see these guys in flesh and blood and hear their problems is an extremely moving (even haunting) experience. The villagers are quite convinced that we will never understand their problems. Maybe we never will. But let us at least start trying?

Karthik Radhakrishnan is a Structural Engineering Graduate from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. He is originally from Chennai, India. He is in particular interested in the rural affairs of India with a focus on farmer suicides, children’s education and women empowerment. Email : karthik.radhakrishnan87@gmail.com

In this article, Satish Chandra questions the accepted definition of “merit” in the caste-based reservations debate in India. 

Editor’s note: SC/ST stands for Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes while OBC stands for Other Backwards Castes. These government caste-groupings are determined by the degree of the lack of socio-economic progress as determined and decided by the government. Studies reveal that SC/STs are on average far poorer, are discriminated against, and lack access to opportunity outside of government mandated reservations when compared to the ‘General’ castes. OBCs are on average better off than SC/STs but worse off than ‘General’ castes. Of course, there are genuine concerns over these government classification of castes, which don’t always accurately reflect the socio-economic conditions of those castes. However, that is a different debate for a different time.

Before reading the article, it would be a good idea to watch the following documentary on caste and untouchability, called India Untouched. It dispels the myth that caste-based discrimination is a thing of the past in India, by capturing – on camera – instances of such discrimination taking place to this day. Alternately, please watch this playlist of very short videos by Video Vounteers.

By Satish Chandra, 2nd August, 2013

Reservations for socially and economically backward castes in academic institutions and government jobs (affirmative action) are a highly contentious issue in India, although mostly for all the wrong reasons. One of those is an argument that reservations dilute merit. Consider this “joke” that was email-forward fodder years ago and is now doing the rounds on social networks. It is good example of how badly caste issues are understood.

The joke – complete with its grammatical errors – is as follows:

“I think we should have job reservations in all the fields. I completely support the Prime Minister and all the politicians for promoting this. Let’s start the reservation with our cricket team. We should have 10 percent reservation for Muslims. 30 percent for OBC, SC /ST like that. Cricket rules should be modified accordingly. The boundary circle should be reduced for an SC/ST player. The four hit by an OBC player should be considered as a six and a six hit by an OBC player should be counted as 8 runs. An OBC player scoring 60 runs should be declared as a century (100 runs). We should influence International Cricket Council and make rules so that the pace bowlers like Shoaib Akhtar (a Pakistani fast bowler) should not bowl fast balls to our OBC player. Bowlers should bowl maximum speed of 80 kilometer per hour to an OBC player. Any delivery above this speed should be made illegal.

Also we should have reservation in Olympics. In the 100 meters race, an OBC player should be given a gold medal if he runs 80 meters.

There can be reservation in Government jobs also. Let’s recruit SC/ST and OBC pilots for aircrafts which are carrying the ministers and politicians (that can really help the country.. )

Ensure that only SC/ST and OBC doctors do the operations for the ministers and other politicians. (Another way of saving the country..)

Let’s be creative and think of ways and means to guide India forward… Let’s show the world that India is a great country. Let’s be proud of being an Indian..

May the good breed of politicians like Arjun Singh (a former minister who enforced reservations in educational institutions in his domain) long live…”

There is an implied assertion in the “joke” – that a person who avails seats reserved for backward castes lacks merit, whereas a person who doesn’t avail it, has merit. But what is this merit that everyone talks about? It is the idea that traits like intelligence and assiduousness are what that determine how successful one should be in their life. It is the central dogma that people like me grew up with. The argument is that if you lack merit and still find yourself in quality institutions, you are a hack; a parasite on society. Profusion of such unmerited people is the reason why India is backward.

On its own, the idea of merit sounds reasonable. However, what gives rise to absurd “jokes”, such as the one above, and what leads to the delusional beliefs about reservations are two things – (a) What the source of merit is, and (b) Which practices in society are labeled as merit based and which are not.

The Source of Merit

Where does merit come from? Is it inborn?

On an average, groups of humans are capable of the same things even when you account for factors like race or gender. There will always be exceptional individuals, but there is nothing to suggest that such individuals can only come from one particular group. History also shows that particular groups at different times have dominated others in terms of intellectual achievements, but this has been so because of the differences in environment and opportunities.

Merit, thus, is not a function of one group’s inherent superiority over others. It is grossly inaccurate to say that merit is inborn into particular groups. Given the right opportunities, any group of people can go on to achieve remarkable things.

This fact, however, falls on closed eyes on people who continue to spew bigoted jokes on the lower castes. Educated India has not given up on archaic notions of inborn merit. Social prejudices linger in people’s minds, often in the form of casteism itself.

The caste system started out on the backs of the argument that a person’s gunas (abilities) and karma determine their caste. In the absence of a system which constantly adjudicates gunas and karma and reassigns a person’s caste, caste took the only course left – it became based on birth. However, in spite of this, people continued to believe that it is a person’s gunas and karma determines caste, not birth. (Ambedkar’s Annihilation of Caste touches upon this)

How then, did people reconcile with the ground reality that caste was and is determined by birth? A part of the solution was to make karma count over multiple lives. The belief was that bad karma in the previous lives was making people born into a lower castes. The other part was the belief that upper castes tend to have an inborn inclination for certain gunas and the lower castes towards a lack of those gunas; that the intellectual achievements of the upper castes are due to their knack for it.

Today, unless someone convinces themselves of this idea, there’s no way he or she can sleep at night believing that the caste system is the best way to organize society, and that the lower castes deserve to be in the position they are in.

The idea of merit in the “joke” parallels these ideas of gunas. Take, for instance, how SC/ST/OBC doctors are made fun of. The “joke” is that such doctors lack merit and hence don’t have the skill to practice medicine. Politicians are at the receiving end of this joke: since politicians are responsible for the existence of reservations, they should get a taste of their policies by dying at the hands doctors who lack merit. What is ignored, however, is the fact that even though backward castes may have secured places in the medical college via reservations, once they get in, they have to pass the same exams that everyone else has to. It is only then will they get an M.B.B.S. certificate.

And yet, the assumption is that SC/ST/OBCs don’t have the gunas that are necessary for being a good doctor. Once a lower caste without gunas, always a lower caste lacking these gunas. The possibility that people learn given the opportunity doesn’t even enter the picture. Such assumptions about merit is just good old fashioned casteism brought to you in a different bottle.

Of course, such ideas about merit aren’t unique to the caste system. At a lower level, they can be seen as arising from fundamental attribution error, and also from a belief in a just world.

Merit in practice

Often, merit has little to do with how successful one is in their life. Consider these cases:

Buying your way through college: Since independence, the rich, who usually belonged to the upper castes, were able to either buy seats in private colleges in India or send their children to other countries such as the United States (when compared to Indian standards of living, this costs a lot of money, even with scholarships). Even though there are plenty of doctors who bought their way into medical colleges, there is a conspicuous absence of jokes about their competency. Not that there ought to be jokes about this; my argument is that merit is not always inborn: people have the potential to learn given the opportunity.

Hiring practices in the private sector: The gold standard of meritocracy – as opposed to ingrained incompetency of the public sector – is the supposed hiring practices of the private sector. (As an aside, the word “meritocracy” was originally meant to be sarcastic). If merit were paramount, companies would publicly advertise for a position and vet as many candidates as they can to get the best merit. But most companies do such things as a last resort – or if there is a mass hiring taking place. The preferred method of hiring for the most part is by referrals, where they restrict themselves to a smaller pool of talent. Sure, even after a referral the candidate has to go through an interview, but the interview process itself is subjective, and anyone who has conducted them knows that candidates who aren’t the best fit do get through. These are often cases of nepotism, which is rampant in the private sector.

How then, does the private sector manage to produce goods and render services with reasonable efficiency? Again, the answer lies in the fact that people learn. A person might not have sufficient merit at hiring time but given the opportunity, but can learn over time and become better at the jobs.

Business ownership: Businesses are typically inherited. There are no entrance examinations to determine who has the best merit to run a business. Some of the biggest businesses in India are run by people who weren’t chosen on merit, but because their parents started the business. Business deals and partnerships too mostly happen by tapping private networks, and not on the basis of merit.

On the one hand we know that merit – in the form of skill – can be acquired given the right opportunities and on the other we also know that merit in the real world doesn’t work in the ideal way. Despite that, there is a lot vitriol directed towards reservations – the kind that is not seen in the cases we examined above. Indeed, it is common to hear rhetorical questions such as, ‘Would you fly in a plane piloted by a reserved category person?’, but not, ‘Would you fly in a plane piloted by someone who was rich enough to buy a seat in the training school?’

A good part of the scorn originates from caste prejudices in the Indian society and a serious lack of effort to prevent acquisition of such prejudices from early on, such as being taught about them in schools. This has led to a very lopsided discourse on the topic of reservations. Despite there being evidence that they work, they’re portrayed as one of the evils plaguing India, without leaving any room for a nuanced discussion.

Satish Chandra would like to thank Sunil for his input. 

Epilogue by the Editor:

Although this article was not about the nature of reservations, a short note on it is in order: this article doesn’t claim that the current system of reservations is perfect. There is room for improvement or both identification and targeting of the affirmative action.

Additionally, a popular argument by a few is that reservations ought to be based on income or poverty, not caste. However, there are two key reasons why this falls short: one, both identification and targeting by caste (keeping in mind socio-economic conditions) is less inaccurate and more practical than by income. Two, more importantly, caste based discrimination doesn’t just arise from income inequality. Backward castes are socially discriminated, as shown in the documentaries linked above. The poor among the backward castes are less equal than the poor of other castes. This, of course, isn’t an argument against welfare for the poor of other castes: affirmative action isn’t exclusive to any one cohort.

However, as previously stated, this is a different debate, for a different time.

The author brings to you an index on  the incidence of administrative civil servants in India. 

By Siddharth Singh, 5th August, 2013

Recently, a young Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officer, Durga Shakti Nagpal was in the eye of a political storm in India. She was suspended by the government of the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) for allegedly “flaring tensions among muslims”. However, the media brought to light that she had taken on the sand mafia in her administrative region (who illegally extracted and sold sand for construction and other purposes) , and this – in all probability – led to her suspension. The implied allegation is that politicians from the ruling political party in that region are hand-in-glove with the sand mafia.

When the Central Government was supposedly giving signs that it may take on these suspension orders, a leader from the state of Uttar Pradesh directed a barb towards the central government, via the media: “the government of Uttar Pradesh would say we need no IAS officers in our state. Withdraw them all, we will manage with our state officers.”

Possibly reacting to this, Sidin Vadukut, a writer and columnist, wondered on Twitter,

Just generally wondering… Which state has the fewest per capita usage of IAS officers? Is there data?

— Earl of Vadukut (@sidin) August 5, 2013

IAS officers are often casually referred to as babus. Babus are the most elite class of administrative officers in India. There are other tiers of bureaucracy, but babus wield the most political clout.

So here it is, the Incidence of Babus Index. It measures the number of IAS officers per 10 million (1 crore) population. Unsurprisingly, Uttar Pradesh – India’s most populous state – has the fewest babus per capita.

Note: AGMUT stands for Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Union Territories (including Delhi)

Disclaimer: These numbers are estimates and are not intended to be a part of a serious study. The population is from the 2011 census and the number of IAS officers is per the Civil List of 2011. The reported number of officers in each state may be inaccurate owing to in-transition posts. 

Filed under: Articles, India

The author brings to light a Mozambican newspaper – named @Verdade - which does not follow traditional financial models, and has in turn become a “tool for change”. The name of the newspaper curiously contains an @ symbol. Their English language website can be found here. 

By Roberto Valussi, 27th August, 2013

Today marks the 5th anniversary of the birth of a very rare creature in the contemporary media landscape: an independent, respected, profitable, popular and free newspaper. The square was circled not in some glitzy borough of London, but in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique.

The product in question is the weekly newspaper @Verdade (‘Truth’ in Portuguese, the country’s official language), which has become the most read national newspaper since 2010, only two years after its first number was fit to print. Its slogan is ’A Verdade não tem preço’, which translates to, ‘the Truth is priceless’.

@Verdade is more than a newspaper; as its founder Erik Charas put it, “I did not start the venture for the business or for the media aspect. My intention was to uplift the country, to contribute in order to do change.”

Charas, a 38 years old entrepreneur and engineer, has deliberately mocked one of the key mantras in the media industry: that which tells them to follow the money. By GDP per capita, Mozambique is the 14th poorest country in the world. A sorry figure, especially in the light of the immense wealth brought by its natural resources and made possible by the peace deal that in 1992 brought to an end 16 atrocious years of civil war.

Charas did not invest £400,000 out of his pocket to set up a newspaper catered to the expanding business sector. Instead, he aimed at the uplifting of the poor classes, which have one of the world’s lowest literacy rates and cannot really afford to buy a newspaper to read even for a small amount of money. As @Verdade’s website argues, “for the price of a newspaper, a person can buy eight pieces of bread, which can feed a family for a day”.

Hence, they decided to distribute the newspapers for free and rely on advertising and other ways to produce revenues. For instance: the tuk-tuks (cheap and sturdy three-wheels vehicle) used for distribution of the paper serve also as taxies, while the main newspaper distribution points also serve as private post offices.

By such means, @Verdade has managed to be sustainable. It prints around 25,000 copies every week, but it is estimated to be read by 400,000 people, a figure way higher than any other publication in the country.

As the @ reveals, the paper has a strong emphasis on internet. Its website receives an average of 2000 viewers per day and its use of social media is fundamental for keeping an open channel with the public; citizen journalism runs very high in the paper’s priority.

​Despite the fact that most of the media is state-owned, the overall situation in the country is better than in others African countries.​ In fact, the last killing of a journalist in Mozambique took place in 2000. As Guy Berger, Director of Division of Freedom of Expression and Media Development at UNESCO told me, “Mozambique has been a forerunner in Africa in terms of several items – such as the constitutional entrenchment of media freedom and protection of journalists’ sources”. A confirmation of his statement can be found in the World Press Freedom Index 2013, issued by Reporters Without Borders, which ranks Mozambique 73rd out of the 179 countries listed (for the sake of comparison: it is way above Greece and Israel).

Mozambique ranks less positively in another international table, the Transparency International’s 2012 Corruption Perception Index. Its 123th position out of 174 reflects the endemic corruption that partially explains why the population has seen very little of the wealth accumulated over the last 10 roaring years. As the natural resource fever is set to last for years to come, independent and non-biased media actors will be needed to promote a more just Mozambique.

And @Verdade is fully aware of that. Its long term plan is to start a radio, increase its circulation and keep acting as a tool for social change. All this, for free.

Roberto Valussi has completed an MA in TV Journalism at City University in London and specialises in Lusophone Africa.

Disclaimer: InPEC’s editorial position does not necessarily subscribe to the author’s views. 

Based on primary information from forums, communiqués and social media activities, this article offers an insight into the online activity of political jihadists and shows how online platforms are being used to support the jihadist cause in Syria.

By Camille Maubert, 4th September, 2013

The notion that the internet is a strong asset for international terrorist groups is not new. Forums have long been acknowledged as the main channel for Al Qaeda to reach out to its followers and articulate its goals and ideology. However, changes in the online environment and the fast development of social media as a preferred way of communication have altered the nature of the jihadi activities online.

Despite complaints by some ideologues that forums are being abandoned by their followers in favor of other medias, these platforms remain an essential part of jihadi media strategies. Some of them, such as Shumukh al-Islam and Ansar al-Mujahedeen, have been active for years and thus benefit from an great credibility with their audience. They are also direct links between AQ central and its supporters, featuring messages from famous jihadi writers and clerics the most prolific of which include Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Tahawi, Sheikh Abu Basir al-Tartusi, Abu Ubaydah and of course AQ’s current leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Aside from official propaganda, forums enable groups and individuals alike to diffuse content, post comments and share links with other bloggers in a relatively safe environment, ensuring cohesion within the jihadi community. However, developments in the Syrian crisis have created new needs which forums could not fulfill. As a matter of fact, Syria has been described as the first Youtube war, where every unfolding event is reported live by individuals using camera phones and posting images and videos online instantly. Such level of democratization and reactivity cannot be replicated in forums which are by definition restricted to members and censored by an editorial board. As a result, militants have turned to other platforms, namely Twitter and Facebook.

The changes in the online environment have been recognised by the Al Qaeda senior leadership in a message posted on the Shumukh al-Islam forum (February 2013) which exposes the reasons why Twitter has become a key part of the jihad. The main point raised in the post is the urge for jihadists to act increasingly on their own in order to limit contacts with AQ central and thus reduce the chances of being caught. This recommendation makes sense in a context where forums and other jihadi media outfits are increasingly monitored by law enforcement authorities. As a result, there has been a considerable increase in social media activities among the jihadi followers and sponsors alike. As evidenced by the below chart, a clear majority of jihadi Twitter accounts were created in 2012, simultaneous to the shift in nature of the Syrian crisis from peaceful protests to violent conflict.

These numbers also coincide with the intensified involvement of islamist groups in the fight against the Assad regime. Several of the main jihadi groups active in Syria indeed have Twitter and/or Facebook accounts, including the Al Haq Brigades, Ahar al-Sham, the Syrian Islamic Front and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) which is by far best represented in the online community due to its status as the most active group on the field.

The aforementioned post by AQ senior commander Mohammad al-Baghdadi listed 66 twitter accounts which he described as the most important jihadi accounts to be followed in support of the islamist cause, including official accounts of groups, charities (i.e. Ansar al-Sham) and media foundations (i.e. Ansar al-Mujahedeen)but also personal accounts of scholars, clerics and other influential figures. In total, these accounts are estimated to be followed by a loose network of 300 000 people, with a core group of 500 to 1000 actively engaged followers. Most groups and individuals tend to follow each other and re-tweet content to disseminate it among a wider audience. They also use Twitter (and to a lesser extent Facebook) as a platform to share links to various media hosted on sites such as YouTube, Safeshare or Twitmail.

Jabhat al-Nusra’s Twitter account is a good example of how the online media nebula works. Although it has been quiet since April 2013, JN remains the most followed rebel group online, with 71,318 followers as of July 2013. Interestingly, the group is not that active in disseminating content using the hashtag #جبهة_النصرة , with only 257 tweets in July. This relatively low activity level can be understood in the content of the group’s PR strategy: One of its officials stated in a Time interview that the group does not make a priority of circulating propaganda material, instead focusing on the military aspect of their operations. As a result of this policy, it is likely that the group’s Twitter page is used as a hub for like-minded activists to rally; between February and April 2013, tweets containing the #جبهة_النصرة tag created 45,959 connections among 20,459 users.

The Jabhat al-Nusra Twitter nebula (source: Jihadica)

It is worth taking a look at what kind of content is being circulated by jihadi social medias and their followers. To a large extent, most media products are images and videos of abuse scenes by the Assad regime. These are not necessarily posted by jihadi outfits themselves but play a strong part in their PR strategy in the sense that depictions of extreme violence on civilian populations carry a strong emotional charge and allow Islamist groups to frame the Syrian crisis as an attack on Sunni Muslims and consequently legitimises violent action as a defensive jihad to save al-Sham, the heart of Islam. YouTube in particular is a good indicator of which type of videos are popular among Islamist followers. One of the most seen videos, entitled “The sincere promise” was released by Jabhat al-Nusra on May 22, 2012 and was viewed by over 10,000 users. Although the absence of English subtitles makes it hard to decipher precisely, it is possible to identify some key components which offer a good overview of the group’s public strategy. As mentioned above, the video depicts typical scenes of violence against the population, followed by a pledge to protect and avenge innocent Muslims. More interestingly though, the significance of this video lies not in its content but in its layout; the fighting scenes are strongly reminiscent of AQ tactics and methods, and their sophisticated alternation with speeches and fighters’ testimonies also resonates with AQ media foundations’ products. In short, JN’s online media publications reveal sound ideological and practical links with AQ central and highlight an effective strategy intended to rally support for its Syrian agenda.

Support for the jihadi cause in Syria – be it in the form of manpower, donations or else – is arguably the main reason for Islamists’ presence on social media outlets. Through the mass dissemination of videos and images of abuse, jihadi groups have been able to reach a wide Muslim audience and rally people to their cause. Links to YouTube videos of prominent clerics’ speeches are widely spread and incite potential recruits to join the jihad by invoking solidarity with the Muslim community (Ummah) and declaring jihad as a personal and obligatory duty (fard’ain) for every Muslim. To cite but a few:

• On 13 March 2012, Jordanian cleric Al Tahawi endorsed Jabhat al-Nusra and called for Muslims to join the jihad in Syria
• Al-Fajr Qadim, an active member of the Shumukh al-Islam forum promoted violent action, urging Sunnis to carry out attacks, kidnappings and assassinations in every region
• On 26 May 2013, the Egyptian Al-Farouq Media Production issued a communiqué calling on “any Muslim who can carry arms” to wage jihad in Syria

While most of the jihadi online activity is carried out in Arabic (see graph below), some of the Twitter and Facebook accounts do attempt to provide non-Arab speaking audiences with translations of communiqués, videos and literature in English and other languages. Some groups also chose to directly target individuals within specific countries, such as Sharia4Belgium or Ansar al-Haqq (France), with publications designed to appeal to these particular audiences.

All in all, it has become evident that social media are a key asset in Islamist groups’ Syrian agenda. The brutality of the visual content disseminated via the various online outfits is intended to provoke a sentiment of anger and solidarity and participates in rallying support for the jihad. Parallel to speeches by prominent clerics, these images contribute to the process of radicalisation of the audience and further legitimises the groups’ call for violent action against the enemies of Islam: Al Assad, Iran, Shi’ites and the West. The increasing participation in the online discussions demonstrates how useful the Islamist PR strategy is, not only in rallying online supporters but also in attracting recruits to the Syrian battlefield. Young Muslims who die in combat are praised on a dedicated Facebook page as martyrs of the revolution, drawing more – including as many as 5000 Europeans – to the cause.

Camille Maubert is an international security researcher for a criminal law enforcement agency based in France. Her work focuses on security, intelligence and counter-insurgency. She has completed a masters degree at King’s College War Studies Department and one at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London.

Filed under: al-Qaeda, Articles, Security, Terrorism

Kyrgyzstan has recently experienced an upsurge in tensions around the issue of pollution in the Kumtor Gold Mine, which it has not known since the ethnic riots of June 2010. Oppositional nationalists are using this tension to put Kyrgyzstan again on the edge of stability, at a moment when Islamist are growing strong in the region and Afghanistan is going through a security transition that could affect the rest of Central Asia.

By Alejandro Marx, 8th September, 2013

Since its independence in 1991, with the dissolution of the USSR, Kyrgyzstan has known stability until the ‘Tulip Revolution’ in 2005 when its first president Askar Akayev, elected in 1990 was succeeded by Kurmankek Bakiyev. Bakiyev left Kyrgyzstan in April 2010 as a result of violent street protests, followed soon after by ethnic riots. After the transitional presidency of Roza Otunbaeva, Almazbek Atambaev was inaugurated president  in December 2011. Atambaev is the leader of the Kyrgyzstan Social Democratic Party, which has 26 out of 120 seats in parliament. He previously held the post of prime minister in the governments of Bakiyev and Otunbaeva. His party rules an unstable coalition with the other parties, apart from the nationalist Ata-Jurt party.

Russia is assuming increasingly the role of a protective power in Kyrgyzstan and the region by providing $1.1 billion of military assistance to the Kyrgyz Army and maintaining military bases in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In addition to combating extremism, this presence allows Russia to maintain leverage against the other countries in the region, particularly Uzbekistan. This move takes place as the NATO Transit Center in Manas is due to be closed by July 2014. China is also active in Kyrgyzstan and the region, fostering security in cooperation with Russia and the Central Asian States through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. China invests also heavily in the mining sector in Kyrgyzstan.

Ata-Jurt: a strong, nationalist opposition

Kamchybek Tashiev is the leader of the Ata-Jurt party, the largest party in parliament with 28 seats, which is the main organ of the opposition in Kyrgyzstan. This party has often been accused of engaging in nationalistic rhetoric and of supporting Bakiyev’s return to power. Tashiev and two other MPs from the Ata-Jurt party were arrested in October 2012 on charges of attempting to forcibly overthrow the government during a protest at the parliament in Bishkek. They were acquitted on 17 June, after the judges were assaulted by Ata-Jurt supporters.

The Kyrgyz government struggles to maintain its rule in the rest of the country. Melisbek Myrzakmatov, the Mayor of Osh, who has the backing of Ata-Jurt, rejects the authority of the government, thus creating a fiefdom where the rule of the State is challenged.

Environmental concerns fuels social unrest

The protests against the Kumtor mine, a gold mine majority owned and operated by the Canadian company ‘Centerra Gold’ and with a 33 percent minority stake owned by the Kyrgyz State started on 27 May. Demonstrators expressed their discontent with the environmental damage caused by the mine and demanded for environment friendly mining infrastructures and medical facilities.

This pollution has been documented by the NGO ‘CEE Bankwatch Network’ in a report from January 2012. The government decided to intervene after protesters seized and closed down the power plant supplying the mine, causing violent clashes. Other parts of the country also saw protests with demonstrators seizing the governor’s office in the city of Jalal-Abad and putting in power a new representative called Medet Usenov. Usenov called for the liberation of Tashiev and two other opposition MPs from the Ata-Jurt Party, who were arrested in October during a protest in favour of the nationalization of the Kumtor mine. Ata-Jurt used the opportunity of the clashes in Kumtor to exert pressure on the government for its own end.

The Prime Minister of Kyrgyzstan, Zhantoro Satybaldiyev, visited the protesters on 1 June 2013 to defuse tensions, and to announce that the government would study the protesters’ demands.

Following this conciliatory move by the government, the police arrested Usenov in Jalal-Abad. In response, his supporters blocked the strategic Bishkek-Osh highway on 2 June. Prime Minister Satybaldiyev, again, sought to ease tensions by freeing Usenov and meeting with the protesters on 5 June. The situation subsequently returned to normal.

Despite the fact that the Kyrgyz government had embarked on new negotiations with the unwilling ‘Centerra Gold’ to create a joint venture to change the legal framework and allow the Kyrgyz States to increase taxes on ‘Centera Gold’ operations and potentially pay for medical facilities and cleaning operation in the region of the mine. Protests took place again on 27 of June in the village of Kyzyl-Suu, close to the Kumtor mine. The citizens have not been convinced by the government’s reassurances.

The conflict around mining in Kumtor is not the first one. Chinese operators and Chinese workers in mining have also been targeted by Kyrgyz protesters in October 2012 and August 2011, angry at the pollution and the treatment Kyrgyz workers receive in these mines

Islamists engaged from Syria to China

Kyrgyzstan has succeeded in avoiding further bloodshed for now, but the upheaval is a reminder of the instability that continues affecting Kyrgyzstan. The withdrawal of ISAF from Afghanistan could encourage violent Islamists to step up their activities in the countries of Central Asia, using unstable Kyrgyzstan as a route to other countries. The Islamist group Jund-Al-Khilafa, based in the North Caucasus, Afghanistan and Pakistan, carried out three separate attacks in Kazakhstan in late 2011, two of them close to the Kyrgyz border. If the Afghan authorities lose control of their territory after 2014, Jund-Al-Khilafa could strengthen its activities in Kazakhstan and use Kyrgyzstan as a route to smuggle weapons and combatants. Despite good neighbourly relations, Kazakhstan has been fortifying its border with Kyrgyzstan in an effort to clamp down on smuggling.

Another Islamist group called the East Turkistan Islamic Party, targeting the Chinese region of Xinjiang, is based in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Again, if the Afghan government fails, Kyrgyzstan would be part of a direct corridor to Xinjiang through Tajikistan. In April and June 2013, violent clashes took place in Xinjiang between ethnic Uighurs and police officers, leading to a death toll of 56.

It has been reported that young Kyrgyz men have been travelling to Syria to fight in the insurgency. The Kyrgyz government is working to localise these individuals and repatriate them. However, those individuals who fail to return to Kyrgyzstan could become links between Islamists in Central Asia and jihadists in Syria, thus bringing new players into Central Asia. Already, in late 2010, an Islamist group, Zhaishul Mahdi, composed of Kyrgyz citizens carried out a series of bombings and attempt bombings in Bishkek targeting a synagogue, a sport complex, and a police station. The leader and some of the members were killed in a shootout with the police in January 2011. The other members were arrested.

Navigating between dangers

Although it is unlikely that Central Asia will see Islamist uprisings, the trend of localised terrorism may increase in the future. An unwelcome development at a moment the population is eager to reap the benefits of the mineral wealth in the region.

Powers in the region are cooperating to maintain security in the region. However, they seem to give a mayor importance to hard security, when soft security is also needed.

The international community has to keep in mind that the fair redistribution of the benefits of mineral resources and the environmentally sustainable extraction of these are part of the support for political democratisation and regional security. The increasing investment in mineral resources in the region will make this issue only too important. In the case of Kyrgyzstan, It is important to resolve the issues caused by mining to the local population. The resolution of these issues would stop Ata Jurt from using the frustration of the population to exert pressure on the State and, thus creating instability.

Alejandro Marx is a Junior Analyst of the European Union Institute for Security Studies. He previously worked for various agencies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

America’s refusal to condemn the military coup in Egypt has revealed the West’s true hopes for the ‘Arab Spring’

By Gulshan Roy, 11th September, 2013

 “If there is a God, he will have a lot to answer for. If not… well, he had a successful life,” Pope Urban VIII once said of a man who would irreversibly frame the study of diplomatic strategy. The Cardinal of Richelieu became France’s First Minister in 1624 at the time of the bloody war of Counter-reformation in Europe. In spite of France’s Catholic faith, Richelieu refrained from joining his religious allies in the war on Protestant Europe. But far retired from the moral obligations towards peace, his calculus rested instead within the strategic reasoning that a protracted and prolonged bloodbath would inflict damage upon both his allies and enemies, and ultimately serve France’s national objective of acquiring more power in Central Europe. Upon his advice, France simply stood back and watched the bloodshed, waiting for the most opportune moment to enter the fray. As the Obama administration silently watches the unfolding tragedy in Egypt, one can hardly eschew the conclusion that the robed religious tactician has found a host of studious followers in Washington.

Indeed, for all the sanctity of Democracy it boasts in the shrines of Capitol Hill and in its litany of texts advocating civil liberties, the United States will forever also shelter its fair share of cynical uniformed hawks. One of them is Chuck Hagel, the current Secretary of Defense. When asked last weekend why his administration was not taking swift and direct action to stop the Egyptian Army’s current persecution of pro-Morsi supporters as the death-toll reached alarming figures, Mr Hagel (albeit after a long reflective pause) straight-facedly replied “we have very serious interests in Egypt and in that part of the world.” Perhaps he would have appeared less cryptic had he completed his sentence thus: “(…) and the current mess does not exactly harm these interests.”

The only readers who ought to be surprised by Mr. Hagel’s stance are those young enough to be forgiven for not remembering America’s unyielding support for the dictatorship regime under General Augusto Pinochet in Chile in the 1970s. While the US did cancel its annual joint military display with Egypt this week, it stopped short of pulling the plug on the US$1.55 billion of annual aid it directs to the rapidly crippling state (of which US$1.3 billion goes to the military). To be fair to Washington, Egypt desperately needs a financial lifeline if it is to have any hope of surviving the current crisis. Its balance of payments registered a deficit of US$18.3 billion in 2011 and it has been increasing since. Its government debt has averaged 85.5% of GDP in the last decade and its foreign currency reserves have more than halved in the last two years.

Yet, what should worry Egyptians (as well as Mr. Obama) most is interim Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi’s bullish declaration on Wednesday that the country would ‘survive’ without US aid. The reasons for this regime’s latest flourish of bravado are twofold. The first is that it is possible that Egypt’s military-men are looking at the Pentagon hawks in the eyes and calling their bluff- for all of Obama’s democratic ideals, his Defence Secretary’s comments reveal to what extent his administration is prepared to cajole Egypt’s current men in power. The second comes from the Gulf’s profound antagonism for the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait have been equally vocal in their support of the army as in their disdain for the Muslim Brothers. The army chief Abdul Fattah al-Sisi in particular has close connections with the Saudis, having served as Defence attaché in Riyadh. As a result, the Gulf-States have pledged a total of US $12 billion in aid to Egypt’s commanders. From both the West’s refusal to sternly condemn Egypt’s military crackdown and the Gulf’s eagerness to back it, the glaring conclusion is that the uniformed men in Cairo know that they hold more than one Joker in hand.

In its latest appraisal of the situation, The Economist argued that the coup was a ‘tactical mistake’ by the military as “the Brothers would probably have lost any election handily; and if they had refused to hold a vote, then the people would have risen up.” Perhaps, but this analysis precludes the very real possibility that the army could have its own agenda in relation to power…

On 26^th October 1954, Mahmoud Abdel Latif, a Muslim Brother, surreptitiously hustled his way through a crowd of ecstatic supporters before once in range, he took out his gun and fired eight bullets at Gamal Abdel Nasser, then Egypt’s leader. He somehow managed to miss each time. It is possible that Latif was a rather pathetic marksman but the more plausible theory is that the assassination attempt had been staged: after the incident, President Nasser ordered a crackdown on the organisation by his comrades in the army. Around 1100 Muslim Brothers were subsequently jailed and the organisation went underground. In the last weeks, when questioned about their confidence in being vocally opposed to the actions of the army, Egyptians have begun to admit to their fears of being detained under the accusation of supporting the Brotherhood.

When the Thirty-Year war ended in 1648 through the Treaty of Westphalia, Richelieu’s strategy could be said to have paid off as France had gained relatively more hegemony in Europe than it did in 1618. But we shall never know whether the man regretted the war’s exceptionally bloody nature (one of the most tragic in the history of mankind, bleeding Germany dry of a third of its population).

If the people of Egypt are further repressed, it will not be long before the files of dormant small assault weapons in Libya, Sudan and the Sinai Desert begin to clandestinely cross Egyptian borders to arm civilians. The result will then almost certainly be a prolonged civil war. This might well be the end of the Arab Spring. The irony is that it comes as a fact of little relevance to the strategic interests of the West.

Gulshan Roy has pursued economics and international studies in university, most recently at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London. He regularly writes for publications in Mauritius, which is his country of origin. He can be followed on twitter here.

Filed under: Arab Spring, Articles

This piece was originally written right after a car bomb explosion on July 18 in Riffa south of the capital Manama. The result of resisting the majority’s demands, the author brings into question whether there is any prudence in endorsing their aspirations.

By Massaab Al-Aloosy, 2nd October 2013

Yesterday a car exploded near the Sheikh Khalifah mosque in Manama, Bahrain.  The incident was immediately condemned as a terrorist attack by the government which warned of attempts to tear the social fabric. Although there were no casualties, the explosion is a reminder of how intricate the situation is in Bahrain. For a long time now, the opposition has been calling for democratization of the political system to no avail.  These calls became louder as the Arab Spring began in late 2010, and which culminated in the 2011 mass demonstration in Manama. From the first glance morality dictates support of the people’s right to choose their own representatives in government, but reality is much more complicated.

The repression of democratic movements has, at least in some cases, contributed to the rise of terrorism¹ and that is a plausible scenario in Bahrain.  It is widely recognized that there is a political cause behind every terrorist act; as Martha Crenshaw has asserted “[t]errorist violence communicates a political message; its ends go beyond damaging an enemy’s material resources.”²  Bahrain, in that regard, is no exception. What makes matters worse is that although the attack appears to be conducted by novices, nevertheless, continuous experimentation might be followed by sophistication. On the other hand, however, change in the government itself does not necessarily yield a democratic government, let alone a conducive one to regional and global powers.

It is impossible to view democratization in Bahrain without taking into account regional rivalry.  The opposition, and by implication the demonstrators, are viewed favorably by Iran and suspiciously by Saudi Arabia.  This rivalry exists within a wider context of the Sunni-Shii schism that is becoming more and more ruthless.  The change in government in Manama would give away to more influence if not domination of the Shia in the country and by extension to an increased Iranian influence in the region – or at least that is what some Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia believe.  In other words, the battle for Bahrain is only part of a bigger conflict between Sunnis and Shia that is occurring also in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq.  No wonder the head of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, believed the demonstrations were repressed because they were Shia.  But that is not all.

The issue becomes more complex when we take into consideration the importance of Bahrain to the U.S.  Since 1948 the island has been one of the main centers of US naval activity.  The fifth fleet maintained the responsibility of covering areas that range from the Red sea to parts of the Indian Ocean, and has 4,200 servicemen that work in the country.  Bahrain was also instrumental during the Gulf war in 1991, the war against Afghanistan in 2001, and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.  Simply put: U.S interest is at stake, and thus U.S commitment to the regime is expected. It should not be surprising that Hillary Clinton, the former Secretary of State, called Bahrain a “model partner” and congratulated the country for successful elections shortly before the demonstrations.

There are several questions one needs to ask before formulating an opinion about events in Bahrain: Should democratization be supported if it means increased influence of a rogue regime? Or put in a different way, should undemocratic but allied governments be backed? How democratic is the opposition? How much do history and culture milieu matter? And finally, should morality prevail over interest? That is the true predicament. 

Citations

• 1. Katerina Dalacoura (2006) Islamist terrorism and the Middle East democratic deficit: Political exclusion, repression and the causes of extremism, Democratization, 13:3, 508-525, DOI: 10.1080/13510340600579516
• 2. The Causes of Terrorism Martha Crenshaw
  

  ---

  Massaab Al-Aloosy worked as a journalist for Al Jazeera in both Iraq and Qatar. He is currently a PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. His focus is on Security Studies and the Middle East